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The objective of the study
The objective of this study was to analyze the pricing of Western European convertible debt 
offerings. Specific objectives were:
• to find out whether convertible debt offerings in Western Europe are, on average, 
underpriced and
• to find factors influencing the pricing behavior of these offerings.
Sources of information and data
The main sources of information were various finance journals examining the pricing of IPOs, 
equity offerings, straight debt offerings and convertible debt offerings. In particular, the study of 
the pricing of convertible debt offerings in the US market in 1988 - 1992 conducted by Kang and 
Lee (1996) was the main source of information for this thesis. The data was collected from two 
sources: basic information about convertible debt offerings in Europe was obtained from the SDC 
Platinum database from the time period of October 1998 to September 2001. More detailed data 
related to the offerings and the underlying stocks and the issuing companies was collected from 
Bloomberg Professional™ service. The sample data consists of 105 Western European 
convertible bond offerings.
The method of research
The convertible debt offerings were examined with methods equivalent to Kang and Lee’s (1996) 
study. Initial raw returns of the offerings were calculated as the return from buying at the offer 
price and selling at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. Especially market 
adjusted initial returns were examined, which are defined as the initial raw return minus the 
corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. The correlations of these initial 
excess returns with different variables related to the issue characteristics and especially to 
different risk factors were then studied.
The findings
A significant mean initial excess return of 1.43% with 64.8% of the returns positive was found in 
the sample data of 105 European convertible debt offerings. This result was found to be invariant 
to bond ratings, coupon rate, maturity, equity beta and probability of conversion. However, issue 
size divided by issuing firm size, standard deviation of stock returns, market sentiment and 
underwriter reputation were found to have some explanatory power on the initial pricing of the 
offerings. Unlike equity IPOs, new issues of European convertible debt neither underperform nor 
outperform the market for at least in the first year after the offer.
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The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock is a well-known and 
widely studied phenomenon. The research on IPO underpricing dates back to the 1970’s with 
the first researchers to report systematic IPO underpricing being Stoll and Curley (1970), 
Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). One of the most recent and also extensive papers on this 
subject is the Ritter and Welch (2002) study, which reports an average first-day return of 
18.8% for a sample of 6,249 IPOs in the United States market from 1980 to 2001. Ljungqvist 
(1997) studied 189 IPOs in the German market from 1970 to 1993 and the result was an 
average underpricing of 9.2%. In addition, Ritter and Welch (2002), who thoroughly reviewed 
the existing IPO literature, claim that they know of no exceptions to the rule that the IPOs of 
operating companies are underpriced, on average, in all countries.
Such a large anomaly related with initial public offerings has inspired the creation of 
numerous theoretical explanations for the large initial returns received by investors of new 
common stock. For the most part, these explanations focus on why underwriters might choose 
to (deliberately) underprice IPOs. The alternative reasons for underpricing include: “the 
winner’s curse” (Rock 1986), costly information acquisition (Benveniste and Spindt 1989), 
cascades (Welch 1991), information asymmetries between issuers and their investment 
bankers (Baron and Holmström 1980; Baron 1982), avoidance of legal liability (Tinic 1988; 
Keloharju 1993), signaling (Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Welch 1989), regulatory constraints, 
wealth redistribution and market incompleteness (Mauer and Senbet 1992).
The pricing of straight bond and seasoned equity issues has also been studied. Loderer et al. 
(1991) examined 1,600 seasoned US equity offerings in 1980 - 1984 and reported a 
significant and slightly positive first day excess return of 0.35%. The underpricing literature 
related with straight debt offerings include the Wasserfallen and Wydler (1988) study, which 
examined 328 issues of new straight bonds issued by Swiss debtors during the years 1980 - 
1982. A slight underpricing result, which was roughly equal to the difference in transactions 
costs between the markets for new and seasoned bonds, was revealed. In addition, Datta et al. 
(1997) examined 50 straight bond IPOs from 1976 to 1992 and found that IPOs of speculative 
grade debt are underpriced, while those rated investment grade are overpriced.
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Although there is substantial empirical evidence on new issue price performance of various 
types of corporate securities, similar evidence on convertible bonds is almost absent in the 
literature. Kang and Lee (1996) state that their paper is the first empirical evidence on the 
pricing of convertible debt offerings. They collected a sample of 91 convertible debt offerings 
that were listed on either the New York Exchange Bonds or the American Exchange Bonds in 
the period 1988 - 1992. The study shows a significant mean initial excess return of 1.11%, 
which is invariant to zero/nonzero coupons, maturity, issue size and bond ratings. Kang and 
Lee (1996) do find, however, that various types of risk inherent in the convertible issues 
partly explain the cross-sectional variation in the initial excess returns. They interpret these 
results as consistent with the differential information model (Barry and Brown 1985).
Studies concerning the pricing of security issues are widely conducted in the US market and 
more seldom in the European markets. The results from North American studies are also not 
always applicable to Europe and specifically the convertible security markets of the US and 
Europe have different characteristics relating to issuers and the investor base according to 
Wright (2000). In addition, the pricing of convertible debt offerings in Europe is totally 
unexamined. This study aims to fill that gap.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that underpricing in security offerings is equivalent to 
issuers leaving money on the table, defined as the number of securities sold times the 
difference between the first-day closing market price and the offer price (or the initial raw 
return times the size of the issue). They find that the average IPO leaves $9.1 million on the 
table, which is approximately twice as much as the fees paid to investment bankers and 
represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm. In a convertible debt setting it is also 
interesting to view the underpricing as an indirect cost of issuing convertible debt.
This thesis has two objectives:
• to find out whether convertible debt offerings in Western Europe are, on average, 
underpriced and
• to find factors influencing the pricing behavior of these offerings.
By examining the pricing of convertible debt offerings I shed light on how the initial returns 
of convertible debt offerings relate with returns observed for other security classes. A 
comparison between the initial convertible debt returns in the European and North American
-7-
markets is also conducted. The reason for choosing Western European offerings instead of 
only Finnish issues is simply because of the small size and amount of convertible debt 
offerings in Finland. The results of this thesis are, however, interesting also from the Finnish 
point of view, because offerings in Europe give a reference point for the characteristics and 
price setting of a Finnish issue (Kallio 2002).
There are no specific theories for the underpricing of convertible debt offerings, but the 
dualistic nature of convertible bonds enables the testing of underpricing theories created for 
both equity and straight debt offerings. The contribution of this thesis is in the testing of 
already existing hypotheses and theories of underpricing, most of which stem from the IPO 
literature, with European data.
This thesis is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of convertible 
bonds (CBs), their basic characteristics and valuation. In addition, the European convertible 
bond market is described. Section 3 examines previous research related to the pricing of 
security offerings and Section 4 summarizes the hypotheses used in this study. Section 5 
describes the sample collection procedures and Section 6 explains the initial return measures 
and gives a brief overview of the statistical methods used. Section 7 presents the results of the 
empirical study and Section 8 summarizes the thesis and presents conclusions.
2 Background information on convertible bonds
Connolly (1998, 1) describes convertible bonds as financing vehicles that are part bond and 
part equity. This duality makes CBs interesting to a variety of investors. Some investors are 
more interested in the bond part and some only in the equity part, but most get involved 
because the instruments can be bond one day and equity in the other. Many CBs are 
complicated by the presence of call and put provisions and some are also affected by the 
levels of foreign exchange rates. Before going into details of convertible bonds I shall first 
discuss the individual components of convertible debt, bonds and equity.
2.1 Bonds
Bonds are issued by governments, local authorities and corporations and are generally 
purchased by investors, fund managers and speculators. Essentially, bonds are loans from one 
party to another. Governments and corporations issue bonds usually to finance large projects 
such as the building of a new dam or the acquisition of another company. The issuance or
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flotation of a bond represents the generation of a contract between the bond issuer and the 
bondholder. The issuer agrees to pay a fixed amount of money (the redemption proceeds or 
redemption price) at the end of a given time period. In addition, most bonds also pay a fixed 
coupon. Coupons are usually paid annually or semi-annually and are announced as a 
percentage of the redemption price. (Connolly 1998, 1 -2)
When someone buys a bond at issue he is essentially lending some entity a lump sum of 
money today in return for the promise of a stream of future payments and a final lump sum. 
As the bond is sold and bought over time, the parties exchange lumps sums of cash and 
forward the promised future payments to someone else. Eventually the maturity date arrives 
and the final coupon and the final redemption price will be paid to the last person holding the 
bond. After the maturity date the bond no longer exists. So when buying a bond you know for 
sure the cash flows that the bond will generate. This is the reason why bonds are classified as 
low- or no-risk investments; in theory anyway. (Connolly 1998, 2)
Unfortunately some issuers default and this is where the problems arise in trying to price 
some bonds and why it is meaningless to classify all bonds as risk free. Most government- 
backed and blue-chip corporations’ issues never fail, but some corporations do get into 
trouble and either default on a coupon or even the redemption proceeds. To quantify the risk 
related with defaulting there exist a number of corporations that do nothing else but rate 
corporate bonds. Corporations that are considered to have a very low risk of default are rated 
AAA. The 9-step rating scale goes all the way down to C (Brealey and Myers 2000, 691). 
Bonds rated between BBB and AAA are called investment grade bonds and bonds with a 
rating of BB and lower are called junk bonds. The ratings also change from time to time. This 
change happens usually because of some event that affects the future likelihood of default. If 
the worst-case scenario happens and the company goes into liquidation, the bondholders 
usually stand in line of any other creditor. (Connolly 1998, 2)
2.2 Equity
Owning equity is the same as having a stake in the company’s fortunes. If the company does 
well, the share price will increase and vice versa. Unlike a corporate bond a share represents a 
sort of ownership. Owning a share in a company that has one million shares outstanding 
means that you own one millionth of all the company’s assets. Corporations usually pay 
dividends to shareholders but not necessarily. Some corporations pay small or no dividends,
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preferring to plough back profits into growing the business. An excellent case of this is the 
success of Microsoft Corporation - a company that pays no dividends at all. (Connolly 1998, 
2-3)
For obvious reasons, holding shares is considered to be more risky than holding bonds and 
this has been empirically shown to be the case historically. Equity holders expect and in the 
long run usually achieve higher returns for taking higher risk. In the event of bankruptcy, the 
equity holders are usually the last ones for any of the remaining assets. (Connolly 1998, 3)
2.3 Convertible bonds
Convertible bonds are interesting in that when they are issued no one really knows what sort 
of instrument they will end up with - shares or bonds? Neither the issuing corporation nor the 
individual buying has any idea of what will happen. What eventually happens depends on 
numerous factors. If the quoted share price rises significantly, the CBs can all be converted 
(once and for all) into shares. In the case that the share price remains the same or falls the CBs 
could eventually be redeemed just like a regular straight bond. It is this feature that makes 
these investment vehicles so unusual and seemingly difficult to price. The uncertainty of what 
is going to happen to the instruments in the future has a huge impact on today’s price 
behavior. The key feature of a CB that makes it a hybrid security consisting of equity and debt 
components is that the individual holding the instrument has an option; he can turn it into 
equity at any time or let it run to expiry and take a cash lump, just like a bond. The decision is 
the investor’s. (Connolly 1998, 3)
Philips (1997, 1) defines convertible securities as follows: “A convertible security is a bond or 
preferred stock issued by a company which gives the right but not the obligation to convert 
into another security, most commonly the company’s underlying shares”. The amount of 
stock obtained in exchange for one convertible bond is indicated by the exchange ratio 
(conversion ratio), which may be a function of time. Convertible bonds are also usually 
callable, which means that the issuer has the right to buy back the bonds. The call price gives 
the price at which the bond can be bought back. This is also often a function of time. Once the 
bonds have been called the holder has the right to convert them into shares. The call feature 
is, therefore, usually a way to force the bonds to be converted earlier than the holder would 
otherwise choose. (Hull 2000, 646)
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2.3.1 Exchangeable bonds
An exchangeable bond can have any of the characteristics of convertible bonds discussed 
above, but an exchangeable bond entitles its holder to convert into shares of another 
company. For example, if a large corporation owns EUR 100 million of shares in another 
company (domestic or international) and it wishes to sell these for strategic reasons, it may do 
so by issuing an exchangeable bond with its own associated credit rating. Assuming that the 
bonds convert into the issued shares no dilution will occur. Therefore, issuing exchangeable 
bonds may be a particularly useful way for companies to divest interests in other companies. 
For example Italian and Malaysian governments have used this method when selling state 
interests in companies. (Philips 1997)
2.3.2 Valuing a convertible bond
Convertible bonds have many different characteristics that affect the value but Figure 1 
presents a simple framework for the valuation of a plain-vanilla convertible bond. The floor 
price of a convertible bond is always the straight debt value (debt component), i.e. the value 
of the bond would it not be convertible into common stock (Figure 1A). The straight bond 
value is almost independent of the value of the stock for healthy firms. However, if the stock 
price falls and the firm is close to bankruptcy, default risk increases and the value of the bond 
falls. The conversion value of the convertible bond (equity component) equals the value it 
would have if you converted it into stock immediately (Figure IB). This value is another 
lower bound for the market value of the convertible bond. Figure 1C presents the value of the 
convertible bond.
Since convertible bondholders do not have to make a decision to convert until maturity, the 
value of the convertible bond is worth more than either the straight bond value or conversion 
value. The difference between the convertible bond value and the lower bound determined by 
the conversion value and the straight debt value is the value of the option that the convertible 
bondholder has. In practice, though, the valuation of convertible bonds isn't that 
straightforward. First, the conversion price is often a function of time, which means that the 
exercise price of the option changes over time. Second, the option valuation is complicated 
also because the stock may pay several dividends over the life of the bond. Third, most 
convertibles are callable by the issuer so both the investor and the issuer hold options on each 











Figure 1. Value of a convertible bond as a function of stock price. A, straight debt value or bond 
floor. B, Conversion value of the bond. C, Total value of convertible bond.
Source: Bodie et al. (1999)
2.3.3 Debt and equity components of a convertible bond
Measuring the debt and equity components of convertible bonds is subject to both complexity 
and subjectivity. Theoretically, only non-callable discount CBs, with no dividend payments to 
the common stock, can be separated into an ordinary discount bond (the debt component) plus 
a warrant (the equity component) entitling the owner to purchase common stock upon an 
exercise payment equal to the principal of the bond. Usually, though, convertible bonds are
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more complex with embedded puts and calls and cannot be to the fullest extent unbundled in a 
set of standard instruments. The major problem here is that the different components 
generally interact (Ingersoll 1977). Brennan and Schwartz (1977) and Connolly (1998) use a 
numerical method for determining the value of complex CBs, and this is often used for 
calculating the value of their standard components. Table I summarizes results obtained by 
several researchers in separating CB components. (Burlacu 2000)
Table I
Equity components for convertible bond issues as calculated in some empirical studies





King (1984) - 103 18 Numerical
method
Brennan and Her (1993) 1976- 1985 155 28 Discounting
model
Billingsley et al. (1986) 1977- 1983 95 39 Two-equation
model
Janjigian (1987) 1968- 1983 357 60 Regression
model
Source: Burlacu (2000)
Even though all the studies in Table I concern CBs in the same market (US) and for similar 
periods, these results are contrasting, thus revealing the difficulty of separating the CBs equity 
and debt portions. The numerical method of Brennan and Schwartz (1977) relies on the 
restrictive hypothesis that the managers’ call strategies are always optimal and therefore 
underestimates the equity component. In empirical studies convertible bonds are often 
classified by their probability of conversion. This is the probability that the CB will be 
converted into equity before or at maturity. The various proxies used for the equity 
component in the empirical literature are presented in Table II. (Burlacu 2000)
The time to conversion used by Davidson et al. (1995) represents the ratio between the firm’s 
signaled growth rate and the market a priori expected growth rate. A low time to conversion 
indicates a high equity component because the CB may be rapidly be at-the-money and, 
consequently, be converted into equity. Kuhlman and Radcliffe’s (1992) proxy also quantifies 
the ability of management to force the conversion of the CBs. The proxy used by Janjigian 
(1987) for the debt component takes into account the volatility of the underlying stock and the 
maturity of the CB. (Burlacu 2000)
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Table II
Proxies used in the literature for approaching the equity component of convertible
bonds




Beatty and Johnson (1985) Call
price/conversion
value
Measures the potential to force conversion 
for callable CBs
Kuhlman and Radcliffe Conversion Measures the potential of managers to
(1992) price/stock price motivate bondholders to convert soon 
after the issue
Davidson et al. (1995) Time to conversion
T = [ln(CP) - 
ln(P)]/p
It is the expected time the CB will be at 
the money. CP, conversion price; P, 
current price of common stock; p, rate of 
stock price appreciation
Janjigian (1987) N{[ln(CP) - 
ln(P)]/aT}
CP, conversion price; P, current price of 
common stock; a, volatility of the 
underlying stock; T, time to maturity; N, 
cumulative probability under a standard 
normal distribution
Source: Burlacu (2000)
2.3.4 Why firms issue convertible debt?
Two popular motives that financial executives give for issuing convertible debt are the lower 
interest rates relative to those on straight debt and the opportunity to issue equity at a 
premium to the current share price. However, financial economists have pointed out that this 
argument is flawed. It compares convertibles to straight debt in a situation, where the firm 
does poorly and straight debt would have been more burdensome. In addition, it compares 
convertibles to equity in a situation, where the firm does well and equity proves more dilutive. 
What this argument fails to mention is that the firm would have been better off issuing 
straight debt if it does well (for then there is no dilution for equity) or common equity if it 
does poorly (when the burden of servicing straight debt would turn out to be greatest). (Lewis 
et al. 1998)
Academics have offered a number of rationales that avoid the above mentioned fallacy. The 
first theoretical justification for convertibles consistent with the modem finance theory was 
provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their much-cited paper on agency costs. They 
argue that convertibles help to control shareholder-bondholder conflicts in two ways: First, by 
providing bondholders with the right to convert their claims into equity, management gives 
bondholders the assurance that they will participate in any increase in shareholder value that
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results from increasing the risk of the company’s activities. Second, by reducing current 
interest rates and so reducing the likelihood of financial trouble, convertibles also reduce the 
probability that financially strapped companies will be forced to forgo valuable investment 
opportunities.
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argue that convertibles are also potentially useful in resolving 
disagreements between managers and bondholders about just how risky the firm’s activities 
are. As suggested above, the value of convertibles is relatively insensitive to changes in 
company risk for the following reason: Although unexpected increases in company risk 
reduce the value of the debt component of a convertible, they also increase the value of the 
embedded option on the company’s stock by increasing volatility.
Stein (1992) gave the Brennan-Schwartz argument a somewhat new twist. Building on the 
insight that many convertible bond issuers build equity through forced conversion of 
convertibles, Stein developed a model that uses information asymmetry between managers 
and investors and the resulting information costs to explain why especially growth firms find 
it attractive to issue convertibles to build equity. In circumstances, where both straight debt 
and equity appear to have significant costs, managers with a great deal of confidence in their 
firm’s growth prospects may conserve significant value by issuing convertibles and planning 
to use the call provision to force conversion when the share price rises in the future. 
Moreover, to the extent that the market is persuaded that convertible issuers have solid growth 
prospects but no other economic financing options (i.e., there is little additional debt capacity 
and a straight equity issue is ruled out by the management as too dilutive), it is likely that the 
stock market will respond less negatively (or even positively) to the announcement of a new 
convertible issue.
It seems that the practitioners’ motives for using convertibles are miles apart from the 
academics’ explanations. The finance literature admits that the fundamental reasons for firms 
using convertibles remains an unresolved question (Mayers 1998).
2.4 The European convertible bond market
The use of convertible debt as a financing vehicle in Europe has grown substantially in the 
past few years. In 2001 new issues of convertible bonds in the European market amounted up 
to €50.8 billion as shown in Figure 2. This means a rise of 85% from the year 2000 and a five-
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fold increase from €10 billion in 1996. Exchangeables represented 65% of the total amount 
raised in 2001 compared with 50% in 2000. Rubery (2002) gives a practitioner's view and 
explains that the popularity of convertible securities in 2001 was due to a combination of low 
interest rates, record-high volatility, low share prices and an increase in the number of 
potential investors. Roemer (2001) also argues that the introduction of the euro in January 
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Figure 2. Convertible debt issuance in Europe. Figure shows the annual issuance of European 
convertible bonds in billions of euros in the period 1996 - 2001. The total issuance of exchangeable 
convertible bonds is also presented. In addition, the line depicts the portion of exchangeables from the 
total amount of convertible bonds.
Source: Rubery 2002 and WestLB Panmure 2002
The European convertible debt market consists mainly of 8 countries: UK, Germany, France, 
Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and Greece. Figure 3 shows that the main three 
markets are UK, Germany and France, where the issued convertible bonds amounted up to 








Figure 3. Convertible debt issuance by country in 2000. Figure shows the percentage of the total 
European convertible debt issuance in 2000 issued in each country.
Source: Baccardax 2001
3 Previous literature on the pricing of security offerings
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one study available on the pricing of convertible 
debt offerings, so I shall first present research from equity offerings and then from straight 
debt offerings. This is also justified from the point of view that convertible debt is a hybrid 
security with both debt and equity like characteristics and the pricing of convertible debt 
offerings is also assumed to have both debt and equity characteristics.1 In the end of this 
section I shall summarize the study of convertible debt offering pricing done by Kang and Lee 
(1996).
3.1 Pricing of initial public offerings
The first researchers to document a systematic increase from the offer price to the first day 
closing price were Stoll and Curley (1970), Reilly (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). Since then the 
phenomenon of IPO underpricing has been subject to extensive research in the finance 
literature. In a sample of 6,249 IPOs from 1980 to 2001 Ritter and Welch (2002) found an 
average first-day return of 18.8 percent. They also know of no exceptions to the rule that the 
IPOs of operating companies are, on average, underpriced in all countries. Generally the
1 This is also the approach used by Kang and Lee (1996) to the pricing of convertible debt offerings.
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offerings of non-operating companies, such as closed-end funds, are not underpriced. IPO 
underpricing seems also to have increased over time. Loughran and Ritter (2001) studied 
6,169 IPOs in 1980-2000 and reported a 7.4% average first-day return in the 1980's, a 14.8% 
return in 1990-1998 hiking up to 65.0% during the internet bubble years of 1999-2000.
These findings have inspired several academics to create theoretical models designed to 
explain the phenomenon of systematic underpricing. Datta et al. (1997) and Loderer et al. 
(1991) summarize from previous studies that these models are based on information 
asymmetry between market participants, the risk of litigation due to legal liability, 
monopsony power of investment banks and incomplete markets. Ritter and Welch (2002) 
classify theories of underpricing on the basis of whether asymmetric information or 
symmetric information is used. Asymmetric information can in turn be divided into theories 
in which IPO issuers are more informed than the investors (about internal projects, for 
example) and into theories in which investors are more informed than the issuer (about 
demand, for example). In the next sections I shall present some of the most prominent 
theories of IPO underpricing.
3.1.1 The issuer is more informed than investors
Assuming that the issuer is more informed than investors, rational investors fear a lemons 
problem: only worse-than-average quality issuers are willing to sell their shares at the average 
price. To distinguish themselves from low-quality issuers, high-quality issuers may attempt to 
signal their quality. In these models, better quality issuers deliberately sell their shares at a 
discount to what the market believes they are worth, which deters lower quality issuers from 
imitating. In the long run, these issuers can recoup their upfront sacrifice after the IPO, either 
in future issuing activity (Welch 1989), favorable market responses to future dividend 
announcements (Allen and Faulhaber 1989) or analyst coverage (Chemmanur 1993). 
Theoretically, however, it is unclear why underpricing is a more efficient signal than, for 
example, committing to spend money on charitable donations or advertising. (Ritter and 
Welch 2002)
3.1.2 The underwriter is more informed than the issuer
Baron (1982) offers an agency-based explanation for underpricing. His model of asymmetric- 
information assumes that the investment bankers have more information about investors’ 
demand for the securities than the issuers possess. Therefore, the issuer may delegate the
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pricing decision to the underwriter, who demands a compensation for the use of his superior 
information. This compensation may be in the form of letting the underwriter offer the 
security at a discount from the price expected in the aftermarket. Baron finds that the discount 
is an increasing function of the issuer’s uncertainty about the market demand for its securities. 
Therefore, IPOs that are subject to greater uncertainty about the market clearing prices are 
predicted to be more underpriced on average.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) study underwriters that go public and find that their shares 
are just as underpriced even though the above described monitoring problem does not exist. 
This evidence, therefore, does not support the Baron hypothesis but it does not refute it either. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that underwriters may want to underprice their own offerings 
in order to make the case that underpricing is a necessary cost of going public.
3.1.3 The winner ’s curse
Rock’s (1986) model is perhaps the most influential among many explanations of the IPO 
underpricing puzzle. This model is also based on information asymmetry but Rock 
distinguishes two groups of potential investors: the so-called informed investors and 
uninformed investors. The informed investors are large institutions, which are assumed to 
have better information about the quality of new issues than small uninformed investors. 
Consequently, informed investors will attempt to purchase shares only when an issue is 
underpriced, but the amount they can buy is rationed. Uninformed small investors, on the 
other hand, do not know which offerings will be underpriced, so they will be allocated only a 
fraction of the most desirable new issues, while receiving all of the least desirable new issues. 
Uninformed investors thus face a winner’s curse: if they are allocated all the shares they 
demand, it is because the informed investors do not want these shares. Faced with this adverse 
selection problem, uninformed investors will take part in IPOs only if they are underpriced 
sufficiently, on average, to compensate the uninformed investors for the bias in the allocation 
of new issues. Taking the average underpricing and the restricted allocations into account, 
Rock’s model also predicts that the difference between subscription price and first-day listing 
price should yield uninformed investors the risk-free rate of return.
Empirical tests of the Rock’s model are impossible to conduct in the United States and most 
parts of the world because information on the rationing process adopted by underwriters and 
issuers is not observable. Koh and Walter (1989), though, test the Rock’s model in Singapore, 
where the unique institutional arrangements governing the new issues market make evidence
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on rationing publicly available. Koh and Walter find strong empirical support for the Rock’s 
major implications. Uninformed investors investor’s returns do not statistically differ from the 
risk-free rate of return. In addition, the authors show that rationing is applied far more 
stringently in underpriced than in overpriced initial public offerings.
3.1.4 Underwriter reputation
Using Rock’s (1986) framework, Carter and Manaster (1990) model the role of the 
investment banker’s reputation. They show that more prestigious investment bankers are 
associated with less risky IPOs. To preserve its reputation, the prestigious underwriter screens 
the companies going public and selects the less risky ones, using information unavailable to 
the general public. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty and information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors. Investors know that by subscribing to issues of reputable 
investment banks they face less risk and, consequently, the first day return is lower for these 
offerings. Using a sample of 501 equity IPOs in the United States between 1979 and 1983 
Carter and Manaster (1990) find a significant, negative relation between the underwriter 
reputation and initial return. Datta et al. (1997) study 50 US straight debt IPOs in 1976 - 1992 
and they also find that investment banker quality is a significant determinant of bond IPO 
returns.
3.2 Pricing of seasoned equity offerings
Loderer et al. (1991) argue that most theories considering the underpricing of IPOs due to 
information asymmetry should apply to seasoned equity offerings as well. The amount of 
underpricing should, though, be modest compared to IPOs because the amount of information 
asymmetry for seasoned equity offerings is much lower than for IPOs. In addition, there exist 
a few theories specifically created to explain the underpricing phenomenon in issues of 
seasoned equity, one of which is the Parsons and Raviv (1985) study.
Parsons and Raviv (1985) assume the existence of two classes of investors with different 
reservation prices. The firm cannot identify the high-value investors to whom it wishes to sell 
resulting in a demand curve for the stock with finite price elasticity. Consequently, investors 
with high reservation prices, concerned about the probability of oversubscription, drive the 
pre-issue and, as a result, the post-issue price above the offer price. Loderer et al. (1991), 
however, examined 1,600 US seasoned equity offerings and found only a significant 0.35%
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first day mean excess return. In addition, the median was zero and only 30% of the returns 
were positive.
3.3 Pricing of straight debt offerings
Datta et al. (1997) argue that information asymmetry between managers and capital markets is 
not eliminated subsequent to the equity IPO. Therefore, IPO models predicting increased 
underpricing with information asymmetry also partly apply to the pricing of corporate straight 
debt offerings.
Datta et al. (1997) view straight debt of being made up of risk-free debt and equity. Thus, the 
riskier the debt offer, the larger the equity component is in the security. Datta et al. (1997) 
also summarize a number of empirical studies that indicate that junk bonds have more 
systematic risk and behave more like equity than investment grade bonds. Therefore, the IPO 
returns of low-grade debt should behave more like equity IPO returns compared to the returns 
of investment grade debt offerings. Datta et al. (1997) also find in their empirical study that 
junk bond issues are underpriced and investment grade bond issues are overpriced.
Scholes (1972) presents the price pressure hypothesis in a stock market setting. He argues that 
when the size of a trade of shares is large relative to other small trades, which can easily be 
conducted at the prevailing market price, the price of the stock must fall to induce investors to 
purchase these additional shares. Wasserfallen and Wydler (1988, 1187) adjust the price 
pressure hypothesis in the context of debt offerings and state that “investors are only willing 
to absorb a large volume of new bonds if a price discount is offered because the necessary 
portfolio reallocations involve transactions costs”. In other words, the larger the issue, the 
larger the expected underpricing is. The empirical study conducted in the Swiss capital market 
did not support this hypothesis, though. In addition, Wasserfallen and Wydler (1988) found a 
slight underpricing of newly issued bonds, which was roughly equal to the difference in 
transactions costs between the markets for new and seasoned bonds.
3.4 Pricing of convertible debt offerings
Kang and Lee (1996) divide convertible bonds into three categories: conventional 
convertibles, put convertibles and zero-coupon convertibles. A conventional convertible 
usually has a conversion premium of 15% to 25% and has a high probability of conversion 
into equity. Therefore such convertibles are widely used as an alternative to an equity issue.
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With a put convertible the investor has the right to redeem the bonds early, at a premium to 
par. Put convertibles have much lower probability of conversion and, therefore, have more 
debt-like characteristics than conventional convertibles. A zero-coupon convertible has 
typically the highest conversion price and is the most debt-like of all convertibles.
The empirical results in Kang and Lee’s (1996) study, using a sample of 91 convertible debt 
offerings over the 1988 - 1992 period, indicated a mean initial excess return of 1.11% with 
nearly 70% of excess returns positive. The initial excess returns were also reported for various 
subsamples: zero/nonzero coupons, different maturities, different issue sizes and different 
bond ratings. As the significant initial underpricing result did not change for the various 
subsamples Kang and Lee (1996) argue that the underpricing is invariant to the offering 
characteristics of the convertible debt issues.
Kang and Lee (1996) classify the possible explanatory variables that may be related to the 
initial underpricing into three groups: ex ante uncertainty variables, straight-debt-component 
risk variables and equity-component risk variables. Each group will be examined in turn.
3.4.1 Ex ante uncertainty variables
Kang and Lee (1996, 238) refer to the differential information model by Barry and Brown 
(1985), which states that “when the market clearing price of a new issue is uncertain, the 
aftermarket price is subject to extra risk until investors collect and process enough relevant 
information to price the new issue”. In addition, an extension of the winner’s curse model 
states that the winner’s curse problem is exacerbated as ex ante uncertainty regarding the 
market-clearing price of a new issue increases (Rock 1986).
Ritter (1991) argues that risky IPOs require higher average initial returns and that the age of 
the issuing firm is a proxy for that risk. Ritter also finds a strong monotonie relation between 
the age of the issuer and the initial return of IPOs. Following Ritter (1991), Kang and Lee 
(1996) take the age of the issuing firm as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty. As a second proxy 
they use the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the issuing firm’s common stock for 
the period from 220 to 20 trading days before the offer date. The empirical results indicate 
that convertible debt offerings made by less mature firms are more underpriced than those 
made by mature firms. The premarket standard deviation of stock returns did not have any 
reliable relation to the initial excess return.
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3.4.2 Straight-debt-component risk variables
Kang and Lee (1996) divide the straight-debt-component risk into interest rate risk and 
default risk. They examine the relation of the initial underpricing of new convertible issues 
and the interest rate risk with Macaulay’s duration measure and the relation of the default risk 
with the issue’s rating. However, the empirical results showed no sign of relation between the 
straight-debt-component risk variables and the initial excess return.
3.4.3 Equity-component risk variables
As mentioned earlier, convertible bond is a hybrid security with debt and equity like 
characteristics. The value of a convertible bond is a combination of its straight bond value and 
its conversion value. As the conversion value depends on the issuing firm’s equity value the 
systematic risk of the issuer’s equity is part of the risk included in the new convertible issue. 
Kang and Lee (1996) use equity beta to analyze the impact of equity risk on initial 
underpricing and they find that equity risk has significant explanatory power with respect to 
the initial underpricing of convertible debt issues.
4 Hypotheses of the study
HI: Convertible debt offerings are less underpriced than IPOs of common stock but 
more underpriced than straight debt offerings.
The only empirical evidence available of the underpricing of convertible debt offerings is the 
study conducted by Kang and Lee (1996) in the US market. Their paper revealed that the 
sample of 91 convertible debt offerings from the period 1988 - 1992 was, on average, 
underpriced by 1.11%. This is much less than the average underpricing in equity EPOs. For 
example, Ritter and Welch (2002) found an average underpricing result of 18.8% in a sample 
of 6,249 US IPOs from 1980 to 2001. Straight debt offerings, on the other hand, experience 
only marginal or no underpricing at all (Datta et al. 1997; Wasserfallen and Wydler 1988). 
Also issues of seasoned equity are found to be only slightly underpriced (Loderer et al. 1991). 
Kang and Lee (1996) argue that the size of underpricing is positively related to the amount of 
pricing-related information that is available to the market.
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H2: The amount of underpricing in convertible debt offerings is positively related with 
the size of the issue.
The second hypothesis is the price pressure hypothesis. It states that investors are willing to 
absorb a large volume of new bonds only if a price discount is offered because the necessary 
portfolio reallocations involve transactions costs (Wasserfallen and Wydler 1988).
H3: Convertible debt issues with higher bond ratings are associated with less 
underpricing than low rating issues.
Datta et al. (1997) argue that since low grade debt contains a larger equity component than 
investment grade debt, the IPO returns of low grade debt should behave more like equity IPO 
returns. They also empirically find that IPOs of speculative grade debt are significantly 
underpriced at issue while investment grade IPOs are significantly overpriced at issue.
H4: The amount of underpricing in convertible debt offerings has a negative relation 
with the age of the issuing company.
Ritter (1991) argues that risky IPOs require higher average initial returns and that the age of 
the issuing firm is a proxy for that risk. Ritter also finds a strong monotonie relation between 
age and the initial return of IPOs. Following Ritter (1991) and Kang and Lee (1996) I take the 
age of the issuing firm as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty.
H5: The amount of underpricing in convertible debt offerings is positively related with 
the standard deviation of the underlying stock.
Ingersoll (1976) and Smith (1984; see Kang and Lee 1996, 240) identify the expected 
volatility of the firm’s assets as an underlying parameter for the pricing of convertible bonds. 
Since the expected volatility is unobservable I take, following Kang and Lee (1996), the 
standard deviation of daily raw returns of the firm’s common stock for the period from 220 to 
20 trading days before the offering date as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty.
H6: The amount of underpricing in convertible debt offerings is positively related with 
the beta of the underlying stock.
The value of a convertible bond is at least as great as the maximum of its straight bond value 
and its conversion value. The conversion value, in turn, depends on the issuing company’s 
equity value. Consequently, the systematic risk of equity contributes an additional risk factor 
to the new convertible debt issue. Following Kang and Lee (1996) I analyze the impact of
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equity risk on the initial pricing with equity beta, which is estimated for the 200 trading day 
period ending one calendar month before the convertible debt issue.
H7: The degree of underpricing in convertible debt offerings is inversely related to the 
underwriter’s reputation.
Carter and Manaster (1990) suggest that prestigious underwriters tend to be associated with 
lower risk initial public offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information 
and also the amount of uninformed investors is lower. Consequently, prestigious underwriters 
do not underprice to as great an extent.
H8: Convertible debt offerings with a larger probability to conversion are related with 
higher underpricing.
Datta et al. (1997) find that low grade debt LPOs are associated with larger underpricing than 
investment grade debt issues and they argue that this is due to the larger equity component 
embedded in the junk bonds. In other words, the larger the equity component, the more the 
issue is expected to behave like equity issues. Kuhlman and Radcliffe (1992) use a CP ratio 
as a proxy for the equity component for convertible bonds. The CP ratio is calculated as the 
conversion price divided by the stock price and derives from an option pricing argument 
which relates the value of a call option to the difference between stock price and exercise 
price. Kuhlmann and Radcliffe (1992) study abnormal convertible debt issue date stock 
returns and hypothesize that the larger the equity component in a CB issue the more the stock 
price reaction should be like in equity issues. The authors find that the equity component of 
the issue, measured by the probability of conversion (CP ratio), is positively related to the 
degree of impact experienced. This result is only marginally significant, though. Following 
the logic of Datta et al. (1997) and Kuhlmann and Radcliffe (1992) I hypothesize that 
convertible debt offerings related with larger CP ratios behave more like equity IPOs and are 
more underpriced than low equity component issues.
H9: Convertible debt offerings experience larger underpricing in hot-issue markets.
IPO markets tend to be cyclical. Some periods are “hot” and other periods are “cold” 
(Ibbotson et al. 1994). Benveniste and Spindt (1989) present the dynamic information 
acquisition model, which argues that regular investors, in order to truthfully reveal their 
demand to an underwriter during the bookbuilding phase of an IPO’s marketing, must be 
rewarded with more underpricing on deals for which there is strong demand. Thus, in hot 
markets, where the demand of securities tends to be higher, larger first-day returns should
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exist. This logic is applicable also to convertible debt offerings, since they are also priced as a 
result of a bookbuilding process. Loughran and Ritter (2002) provide a bargaining model in 
which underwriters want a lower offer price and issuing firms desire a higher offer price. 
Their prospect theory argues that when unexpectedly strong demand becomes apparent during 
the preselling period, issuing firms acquiesce in leaving more money on the table in the form 
of underpricing. When demand is unexpectedly weak, issuing firms negotiate more 
aggressively, implying less underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (2002) also find empirical 
evidence that IPOs are more underpriced after a rise in equity markets. Mann et al. (1999) 
study the popularity of convertible debt issues and find that also for convertible securities 
there exist “hot-issue markets”, i.e. when equity markets have risen.
5 Sample data
5.1 Collection of the sample data
The initial sample consists of all convertible debt offerings issued in Europe that are reported 
in the SDC Platinum database during the period October 1998 - September 2001. The end of 
the sample period is determined by including the latest convertible bonds that have one year 
performance data available. A total of 279 new issues of convertible debt were collected. This 
initial sample includes only one Finnish convertible debt offering, which is a 200 million euro 
issue done by Sanoma WSOY in September 2001. To achieve a truly European perspective I 
exclude all offerings that are issued by a non-European company and/or have the underlying 
equity trading in a non-European stock exchange. These cases are possible in global offerings, 
where a Taiwanese firm, for example, issues convertible debt in the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange. Also in exchangeable convertible debt offerings the underlying stock can be of a 
non-European listed company. In addition, I exclude those issues for which the closing price 
is not reported in Bloomberg for more than 30 calendar days after the offering.
Most of the data related to the convertible debt offerings such as exact issuance dates, 
maturity dates and prices at issuance and on the first trading day I collected from Bloomberg 
Professional™ service.2 Also data related to the firms issuing the convertible bonds I 
assembled using Bloomberg Professional™.
21 thank Nordea Securities Corporate Finance Oy for letting me use their Bloomberg Professional™ service.
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5.2 Descriptive statistics of the sample data
The final sample consists of 105 European convertible bond offerings of which only 13 
offerings are exchangeable bond issuances. Although Figure 2 shows that exchangeable bonds 
covered around 65 % of the total convertible bond issuance in 2001, exchangeable bonds 
frequently lacked adequate amount of price data in Bloomberg and were therefore excluded 
from the final sample. The amount of offerings in each country is shown in Figure 4. 35 of the 
sample convertible debt offerings were made in France and 22 in Luxembourg. These 
countries also account for over a half (€32.8 billion) of the total amount of €50.5 billion 
raised. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom had issuances in the range between 6 and 8 
billion euros and the other countries in the sample were Germany, Switzerland, Italy and 
Finland with a total amount issued of under three billion euros in each country.
€ billion Amount
Figure 4. The division of the convertible debt offerings by country. The picture shows the amount 
of offerings and the total size of the issues in billions of euros in each country in the sample of 105 
European convertible debt offerings in the period 10/1998 - 09/2001.
As can be seen from Figure 5 the bond ratings range from AA to CC on the Standard and 
Poor’s scale. 49 issues (47%) are unrated and this amount corresponds with 26% of the total 
sample issuance. 36 convertible debt issues (34%) are investment grade (AA to BBB) and 
they amount up to €27.1 million (54% of the total amount).
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Additional descriptive statistics for the final sample of convertible debt offerings is presented 
in Table III. The sizes of the offerings range from €11 million to €2.7 billion. The median of 
the issue size is €350 million. In comparison, the range of the sample of 91 American 
convertible debt offerings that were used in the study of Kang and Lee (1996) was between 
$30 and $3,200 million. The median issue size in their sample was $175 million, which is 
roughly a half of the median of the sample used in this thesis. The median issue size is 9.6% 
of the market value of the equity measured at the last day of the fiscal year preceding the 
offering. The median maturity for the sample issues is 5.1 years and the median period in 
which the issuer cannot call the debt is 3.0 years. The median coupon rate is 2.3% and the 
sample includes seven zero-coupon convertible debt offerings.
€ billion Amount
Total size------- Amount of Issues
Figure 5. Ratings of the convertible debt offering sample. The ratings of the offerings are collected 
from the SDC Platinum database and Bloomberg Professional™. The sample of 105 European 
convertible debt offerings is rated from AA to CC on the Standard and Poor’s scale. 49 of the 
offerings were not rated.
The last four rows in Table III describe characteristics of the issuing firms in the sample. 
Equity beta is estimated for the 200 trading day period ending one calendar month before the 
convertible debt issue. The market index used in beta calculations is the general index of the 
stock market, where the common stock is traded. In contrast to the US market, where 
convertible debt is usually issued by high-risk, high-growth and highly leveraged firms (Kang
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and Lee 1996) and (Wright 2000) Table III shows that European convertible debt offerings 
are on average issued by firms with a low beta and debt ratio and with a median age of 30 
years. The median yearly standard deviation of stock returns is 44.8% calculated from daily 
raw returns from 220 to 20 trading days preceding the issue date.
Table III
Descriptive statistics for a sample of 105 European convertible debt offerings in the
period 1998 - 2001
Variable Sample
size
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Issue size 
(€ millions)
105 481 350 11 2 680
Issue size/market 
value of equity3
98 0.13 0.96 0.003 0.91
Maturity
(years)
105 6.3 5.1 2.1 20.4
Call protection period 
(years)
97 3.3 3.0 0.0 7.0
Coupon
(%)
105 2.3 2.0 0.0 6.0
Equity
hetab




100 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.95
Age of the issuing 
firm 
(years)d
99 55 30 1 207
Standard deviation of 
stock returns (%)e
103 46.4 44.8 14.9 108.7
a Market value of equity is the market value at the end of the fiscal year preceding issue date.
b Equity beta is estimated with the Bloomberg Professional™ beta calculation tool. The period for which the beta 
is calculated is the 200 trading day period ending one calendar month before the convertible debt issue. The 
index against which the stock price is regressed is the market index of the issuer’s home stock market. (CAC40 
in France, DAX in Germany etc.)
c Total debt and total assets are based on the values at the end of the fiscal year preceding issue date 
d Age of the issuing firm is calculated as year of issuance minus year of incorporation. 
e Standard deviation is calculated using daily raw returns from 220 to 20 trading days before issue date.
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6 Methods
6.1 Initial raw return
The methods used in this study follow the methodology of Kang and Lee (1996). The first 
return measure calculated for each convertible debt offering is the initial raw return (Rj). This 
is defined as the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price 
on the first day of public trading,
*,= x 100%, (1)
where Pt is the closing market price on day t (t = 1 is the issue day) and P0ffer is the offer price. 
For quite a few of the convertible bonds the first price quote available in Bloomberg 
Professional™ was days after the offering. The median delay from the issue day to the first 
reported price in Bloomberg was 8 days. Kang and Lee (1996) experienced similar problems 
with their sample of 91 US market convertible debt offerings and they had a median delay of 
six days. They argue that this delay could be due to the fact that underwriters are motivated to 
withhold the price quotes so as to have larger bid-ask spreads than otherwise.
6.2 Initial excess return
Initial excess return (REi) is measured using the euro denominated UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index. On September 29, 2002 the index had 193 constituents. This index is 
available also divided into speculative grade/not rated and investment grade indices. Kang 
and Lee (1996) argue that the speculative grade and investment grade convertible bond 
markets are different by including a totally different investor base, for example. Therefore, 
they use different indices on the basis of debt rating in calculating the excess initial return. I 
shall also use the two different indices from UBS Warburg. The index values are set at 100 on 
September 30, 1998 and values are available from June 30, 1995. The performances of the 
convertible indices and a general European stock market index (S&P Europe 350) for the 
period Oct 1, 1998 - April 22, 2002 are presented in Figure 6. The shaded area describes the 
sample period (Oct 1, 1998 - Sep 30, 2001). It is noteworthy that the sample period includes 
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Figure 6. The development of the UBS Warburg European Speculative and Investment Grade 
Convertible Indices vs. the S&P Europe 350 stock market index. UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Indices consist of all European convertible debt issues of at least $100 million of market 
capitalization. The values of the indices are set at 100 on September 30, 1998. The time period above 
is October 1, 1998 - September 26, 2002. The S&P Europe 350 Index measures the performance of 
equities in 16 Pan-European markets, covering approximately 70 percent of the market capitalization. 
The values of the S&P Europe 350 have been scaled so that they start from 100 at September 30, 
1998. The shaded area describes the sample period from Oct I, 1998 to Sep 30, 2001. 
Source: Bloomberg Professional™ and Standard & Poor's website.
The initial excess return is calculated by subtracting the UBS Warburg European Speculative 
or Investment Grade Convertible Index return from the initial raw return,
REX =RX-
'( CBI, ^
‘ 1 x 100%\yCBJ0 y (2)
where CBIt is the UBS Warburg European Convertible Index value on day t (t = 1 is the issue 
day) and CBIo is the value of the index on the day preceding the issue.
6.3 Statistical methods
All statistical calculations and tests are conducted with the SPSS 10.1 computer program. All 
mean returns are tested with the Student’s t-test whether they differ from zero. For 
comparison, median returns are also calculated and their difference from zero is tested with 
the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The Kolmogorov-Smimov test is used to test whether the
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initial returns are normally distributed. Linear correlation between different variables is 
analyzed by calculating the Pearson correlations. In addition, multivariate regression analysis 
is used to estimate the explanatory power of the most significant variables into the initial 
pricing of convertible debt offerings.
7 Results
This section examines the initial pricing of the sample European convertible debt offerings 
with statistical methods. In 7.1 the initial pricing is studied in general. In 7.2 possible reasons 
for the initial pricing is examined. Section 7.3 combines the four most significant explanatory 
variables in regression analysis and the last section looks at the one-year performance of the 
convertible bonds.
7.1 Initial returns
This section examines the first hypothesis and presents the results for the initial pricing of 
European convertible debt offerings. Histograms for the initial returns are presented in Figure 
7 and the corresponding frequency table can be found Appendix I. The initial raw returns fall 
in the range from -5% to +13% and the initial excess returns in the range from -5% to 11% 
with one exception. The 5-year convertible bond with a coupon rate of 4% from Augusta 
Technologie AG issued on 4 February 2000 experienced a remarkable 20.79% raw and a 
20.35% excess return on the first day of public trading (11 days after the issuance). The 
company states in a press release concerning the issue (Augusta Technologie AG 2000) that 
the price was set at the upper end of the bookbuilding range due to great demand. Still, the 
first trading price hiked over 20%. In addition, the issuance date is exactly seven months 
before the S&P Europe 350 index reached its all time high at 1690.69 (see also Figure 6). On 
the issuance date the index had a value of 1522.47. For comparison, the index was valued at 
918.63 on 17 October 2002. The Augusta convertible issue is, therefore, a good example of 
how the "techno boom" affected not only the equity markets but also the (equity-linked) 
convertible bond markets.
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Figure 7. Histograms for percentage initial raw and excess returns. Initial raw return (Ri) is the 
return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price on the first day of public 
trading. Initial excess return is the market adjusted return defined as Ri minus the corresponding UBS 
Warburg European Convertible Index return. Histograms describe the sample of 105 European 
convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001.
From the histograms it seems that both the initial raw returns and the initial excess returns are 
quite well normally distributed. This is an important feature of the initial returns, since most 
of the statistical tests are based on the premise that the variable is normally distributed 
(Heikkilä 1998). I conduct also Kolmogorov-Smimov tests (Appendix II) on both variables to 
verify the normality of the initial returns. The p-values for the initial raw and excess return are 
0.003 and 0.076, respectively. This result implies that the initial excess returns are normally 
distributed, but the initial raw returns are not. Therefore, the statistical tests that assume 
normality might give somewhat misleading results for the initial raw returns.
Summary statistics of the initial returns for the full sample of 105 European convertible debt 
offerings are in Table IV. The mean initial raw return (Ri) for the full sample is 1.56% and 
this result is significantly different from zero at the 0.1% significance level (Appendix II). 
The median initial raw return is lower than the mean, 0.50% and the Wilcoxon sign rank test 
indicates that this is also different from zero at 0.1% significance level (Appendix III). 17
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issues out of 105 (16.2% of the sample) had an initial raw return of exactly zero and 82 issues 
(78.1%) had non-negative initial raw returns.
Table IV
Summary statistics on the percentage initial raw and excess returns for a sample of 105 
European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001
R, is the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price on the first day of 
public trading. RE] is the market adjusted return defined as R¡ minus the corresponding UBS Warburg 
European Convertible Index return. Percent positive is the percentage of positive returns. In 17 
samples (16.2%) the initial raw returns were exactly zero, which are considered positive. P-value 
describes the significance level in a 2-tailed t-test. *** indicates significance of the Wilcoxon sign- 















0.50*** -4.75 20.79 78.1




1.03*** -4.63 20.35 64.8
The results are similar using initial excess returns REi (Table IV). The mean and median 
convertible bond market-adj usted returns are 1.43% and 1.03%, respectively. Both the mean 
and median are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level (Appendices II and III). 68 
offerings (64.8% of the sample) have a non-negative initial excess return.
As mentioned in the introduction, the average IPO leaves $9.1 million on the table according 
to Loughran and Ritter (2002). The median amount is only $2.3 million though. To apply this 
to convertible debt offerings the money left on the table is defined as the initial raw return 
times the size of the issue. For the sample of 105 European convertible debt offerings the 
average amount of money left on the table is €6.4 million and the median is €1.0 million. This 
implies that similarly to IPOs most of the money left on the table comes from a minority of 
convertible debt offerings. It is also interesting to see that the amount of money left on the 
table in convertible debt offerings is not remarkably lower than in IPOs. Although the 
percentage initial underpricing is much lower in convertible debt offerings, the average size of 
the CDOs is much larger.
7.1.1 Initial returns in different countries
The sample size of 105 gives also the possibility to look at the mean initial returns in different 
countries separately. Figure 8 shows the mean initial raw and excess returns in each country 
and more detailed information can be found in Appendix IV. The sample includes only one
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Finnish and one Italian convertible debt issue so their average initial return values are not that 
meaningful, though.
Figure 8 shows that Germany has the highest mean initial returns. This is most likely due to 
the fact that the Augusta convertible bond with a 20.35% initial excess return is included in 
the sample’s six German convertible debt issues and, therefore, distorts the results upwards. 
The Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have at least 14 issues each 
in the sample it is meaningful to compare the mean initial returns in these four countries. 
France and Netherlands have mean initial returns between 2% to 3%. In Luxembourg and 
UK, on the other hand, the mean initial returns lie around 0% to 0.5%.
4,0
■ Initial Raw Return ■ Initial Excess Return
Figure 8. Initial mean raw and excess returns by country of issuance. Initial raw return (Ri) is the 
return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price on the first day of public 
trading. Initial excess return is the market adjusted return defined as Rj minus the corresponding UBS 
Warburg European Convertible Index return. The results above are from a total sample of 105 
European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001.
To measure the statistical significance of the difference in the initial returns I conduct a t-test 
for the equality of mean initial returns of bonds issued in France and Luxembourg. These two 
countries are chosen, because of the adequate sample size (33 in France and 22 in 
Luxembourg). The results of the tests can be found in Appendix V. Indeed, the results show 
that the mean initial raw (p = 0.010) and excess (p = 0.012) returns in France and
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Luxembourg differ from each other. The initial underpricing of convertible debt offerings 
seems, therefore, to be heavier in France than in Luxembourg.
7.1.2 Initial returns in different time periods
The sample period includes three years starting from 1 October 1998. The mean initial excess 
and raw returns during one-year periods are displayed in Figure 9. The diagram shows that the 
middle-year 10/1999 - 9/2000 has clearly included more underpricing in convertible debt 
offerings than the other two periods. Figure 6 shows that the end of September 2000 was also 
the end of the stock market rush and the “techno boom”. The first two years of the sample 
period included a roughly similar stock market hike. It seems from Figure 9, therefore, that 
the initial underpricing of European convertible debt offerings was at the highest level during 
the last year of the bullish stock market. During the last year of the sample period 
underpricing fell lower than it had been during the first two years. This result is quite logical 
in the light of the huge initial IPO returns during the second year of the sample period. The 
difference in means test does not indicate a significant difference between the mean initial 
excess returns of either the first and second year or the second and third year, though.
10/1998-9/1999 10/1999-9/2000 10/2000-9/2001
■ Initial raw return ■ Initial excess return
Figure 9. Initial mean raw and excess returns in different time periods for a sample of 105 
European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001. The initial excess return is the 
initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. The 
initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price on 
the first day of public trading.
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7.1.3 Initial returns by issue characteristics
This section explores the possible relatedness of issue characteristics to the initial 
underpricing of convertible debt offerings. Specifically, the second and third hypotheses are 
tested.
Table V shows initial excess returns (REi) divided into various subsamples. The first division 
is by issue size. The issue size is the euro denominated (in millions) amount of proceeds of 
the issue before a possible exercise of the over-allotment (greenshoe) option. Since the 
greenshoe is possibly exercised after the issue is initially priced, it is more reasonable to use 
the amount without the greenshoe. Both the mean and the median initial excess return appear 
to grow with the issue size. Returns also tend to be more often positive in larger issues. In 
addition, the significance that the mean or median differs from zero seems to increase with 
size class. I exclude the Augusta convertible (outlier) from the sample and calculate the 
Pearson correlation between issue size and initial excess return in Table VI. The result is only 
0.043 and the result is insignificant (p-value 0.662) so there isn’t any statistically significant 
linear correlation between issue size and initial excess return. Figure 14 in Appendix VI 
visualizes this fact. The result is qualitatively the same using the logarithm of issue size 
instead of the size of the issue. I also calculate the correlations separately in each market of 
issuance and find that in the United Kingdom (N = 14) there is a strong positive correlation 
between the issue size and initial excess return. The Pearson correlation is 0.585 with a p- 
value of 0.028. The scatter diagram (Figure 15) for the UK sample is in Appendix VI. In the 
United Kingdom, using the logarithm of the issue size increases the correlation to 0.663 and 
lowers the significance level to 1%.
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Table V
Summary statistics on the percentage initial excess returns for a sample of 105 
European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001 by issue characteristics
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. Percent positive is the percentage of 
positive returns. P-value describes the significance level in a 2-tailed t-test. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance of the Wilcoxon sign-rank test at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Sam Mean return Median Min Max Percent
pie (p-value) return return return positive
size
Issue size
< €200M 37 1.38 0.43 -4.63 20.35 56.8
€201M- €500M 39
(0.069)
1.41 0.90* -4.00 10.63 66.7
>€500M 29
(0.008)
1.50 1.68** -4.08 5.98 72.4
(0.002)
Maturity 
< 5 yrs 17 2.27 1.88* -1.17 8.55 70.6
5 - 10 yrs 77
(0.007)
1.33 1.03** -4.63 20.35 63.6
> 10 yrs 11
(0.002)
0.75 0.72 -4.08 5.37 63.6
(0.362)
Bond rating
Investment grade 36 1.39 1.51** -2.68 6.19 63.8
(AAA to BBB) 
Speculative grade 





0.88** -4.63 20.35 66.7
Coupon rate
Zero-coupon 7 -1.25 -1.14* -4.08 0.53 14.3
0% - 1.5% 38
(0.062)
1.27 0.67** -2.68 7.18 71.1
1.5% - 3.0% 29
(0.002)
2.05 1.78** -4.63 10.29 75.9
> 3.0% 31
(0.002)
1.63 0.90 -4.00 20.35 58.1
(0.066)
Testing the price pressure hypothesis only with linear correlation between initial underpricing 
and issue size might not be adequate. The reason is that large issues are probably associated 
with large issuers, which might imply less risky offerings and more pricing related 
information on the market. This would indicate less underpricing. To take this into account I 
conduct regressions using the firm size as a control variable in Table VII. In addition, issue 
size divided by firm size is used as an independent variable. Although the independent
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variable issue size does not show any significance, the issue size divided by the firm size 
shows slight significance. The sign of the coefficient (5.98) is also positive, as expected. In 
the third regression the issue size divided by the firm size variable gets a p-value of 0.066 and 
3.5% explanatory power measured with R2. The regression does imply, therefore, modest 
support for H2, the price pressure hypothesis.
Table VI
Pearson correlations between issue characteristic variables
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. Rating is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if the convertible issue is rated investment grade and a value of zero if the issue is 
speculative grade or does not have a rating. The value above is the correlation factor and the value in 
brackets indicates the significance of the correlation factor. *** indicates significance at the 0.1%


































































The initial excess returns in different maturity classes as presented in Table V seem to follow 
a declining pattern with a growing maturity. The significance of this result is quite modest, 
though, since the sample sizes in the smallest and largest maturity classes are small. In fact, 
62 convertible bond issues (59% of the sample) had a time to maturity in between 5 and 6 
years. The scatter diagram in Appendix VII visualizes this fact. As the Pearson correlation 
between time to maturity and initial excess return is also very small (-0.034) and insignificant 
(p-value 0.734) I conclude that there is no relation between the time to maturity and the initial 
excess return. This result is similar in all countries.
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Table VII
Regressions of the initial excess returns of convertible debt offerings on issue size related
variables
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. Firm size is calculated as the market 
value of equity at the end of the accounting period preceding the issue plus the book value of debt at 
the same date. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. The 
sample data excludes the Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return and seven other 








Logarithm of issue size 0.643
(0.222)
Issue size/firm size 5.98
(0.066)
Firm size -4.57* 10"6
(0.534)
Logarithm of firm size -0.371
(0.223)
F-ratio 0.30 0.822 3.45
(0.742) (0.443) (0.066)
R2 (%) 0.6 1.7 3.5
Sample size 97 97 97
To investigate the third hypothesis, the relation between default risk and initial underpricing, 
the initial excess returns are calculated separately for investment and speculative grade 
convertible bond issues in Table V. Convertible issues without a rating are included in the 
speculative grade bond group. With the full sample the mean initial excess returns in both 
groups are almost equal (1.4%). The medians indicate that investment grade bonds are 
slightly more underpriced than junk bonds, though. After removing the Augusta convertible 
(outlier) from the sample the initial excess returns for the investment and speculative grade 
bonds are 1.39% and 1.16%, respectively. According to a difference in means test for equal 
variances these mean initial excess returns are not significantly different from each other. In 
addition the correlation between the indicator variable Rating, which receives a value of one if 
the issue is investment grade and a value zero if the issue is speculative grade or not rated, 
and initial excess return is only 0.037 and insignificant. Therefore, the hypothesis that
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investment grade convertible bonds would initially be less underpriced than junk bonds does 
not receive support.
The last division of initial excess returns in Table V is by coupon rate. From the results it is 
difficult to find any pattern other than that zero-coupon convertibles seem to be overpriced, 
on average. The correlation between initial excess return and coupon rate as shown in Table 
VI is also small (0.043) and insignificant (p-value of 0.662). Similar results are observed in all 
countries separately. Kang and Lee (1996) argue that zero-coupon convertibles are the most 
debt like of all convertibles because the conversion price is typically the highest. This would 
imply lower initial underpricing for zero-coupon convertibles following the logic that straight 
debt IPOs are significantly less underpriced than equity IPOs. Since the European sample 
used in this study includes only seven zero-coupon convertible issues, any statistically 
significant conclusions cannot be drawn.
7.2 Possible explanatory variables
This section evaluates the role of possible explanatory variables in the initial pricing of 
European convertible debt offerings. Specifically, hypotheses 4 - 9 are tested.
7.2.1 The age of the issuing company
The fourth hypothesis predicts a negative relation between the age of the issuer and the initial 
underpricing of convertible debt offerings. The age of the issuing company acts as a proxy for 
uncertainty considering the market clearing price of the issue. Age is calculated as the year of 
the offering minus the year of incorporation. Kang and Lee (1996) use the natural logarithm 
of age in linear regression models so I have taken the logarithm of age as well for comparison. 
The scatter diagrams in Figure 10 visualize that the initial excess returns of European 
convertible debt offerings are not related with the age of the issuing firm. The correlation 
factors between the initial excess return and the age variables are negative, as expected, but 





Firm Age Natural logarithm of firm age
Figure 10. The relationship between initial excess return and issuing firm age in the sample of 
104 European convertible debt offerings. The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the 
corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return 
from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. 
The age of the firm is calculated as the year of the offering minus the year of incorporation. The 
scatter diagrams exclude the Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return.
7.2.2 Standard deviation of stock returns
The fifth hypothesis predicts a positive relation between the standard deviation of the 
underlying stock and the initial underpricing of convertible debt offerings. The standard 
deviation of stock returns (volatility) is calculated from daily returns for the period from 220 
to 20 trading days before the offer date. This volatility is also considered as a proxy for 
uncertainty related to the market clearing price of the issue. Higher volatility, therefore, 
implies higher underpricing. The empirical data depicted in the form of a scatter diagram in 
Figure 11 gives very modest support to this hypothesis. The volatility of stock returns seems 
to slightly relate with the initial excess return. The Pearson correlation between initial excess 
return and volatility is positive (0.181), as expected, and the p-value is 0.069 implying almost 
significant positive relation between the initial excess return and volatility of the issuing 
firm’s stock price.
An odd result is found when separating the sample by country of issuance. The 14 UK 
convertible issues are shown as darker dots in Figure 11. A clear declining pattern can be 
observed implying larger underpricing with riskier issues. Correlation between the variables is 
a strong -0.743 at a 1% significance level. This phenomenon is difficult to explain since it is
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against the theoretical background. A somewhat probable explanation would be the small 
sample size ( N = 14), which can give misleading results.
So □
Volatility
Figure 11. The relationship between initial excess return and the standard deviation of daily 
returns of the underlying equity in the sample of 104 European convertible debt offerings. The
initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. The volatility of the underlying stock is 
calculated from daily returns for the period from 220 to 20 trading days before the offer date. The 
darker dots represent the convertible debt offerings issued in the UK. The sample excludes the 
Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return.
7.2.2 Systematic risk of equity
Equity beta is used to explain the impact of equity risk on initial underpricing of convertible 
debt offerings in the sixth hypothesis. Again I start with visual examination and present the 
scatter diagram between beta and initial excess return in Figure 12. This does not show any 
relation. The correlation between the two variables is positive (0.066), as expected, but 
insignificant so there is no linear relation between the initial excess return of convertible debt 
offerings and equity beta in the European sample used. This result stays qualitatively the same 
when the sample is partitioned by countries of issuance.
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Beta of the underlying stock
Figure 12. The relationship between initial excess return and the beta of the underlying equity in 
the sample of 104 European convertible debt offerings. The initial excess return is the initial raw 
return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. The initial raw 
return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price on the first 
day of public trading. Equity beta is estimated with the Bloomberg Professional™ beta calculation 
tool. The period for which the beta is calculated is the 200 trading day period ending one calendar 
month before the convertible debt issue. The index against which the stock price is regressed is the 
market index of the issuer’s home stock market. (CAC40 in France, DAX in Germany etc.). The 
sample excludes the Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return.
7.2.4 Underwriter reputation
This section tests the seventh hypothesis, which states that the degree of underpricing in 
convertible debt offerings is inversely related to the underwriter’s reputation. This thesis uses 
the list of underwriter rankings constructed by Loughran and Ritter (2001), which uses data 
from the late 1990’s and, therefore, fits bets to this study with a sample period of 1998 - 2001. 
Loughran and Ritter (2001) have started with the previous rankings by Carter and Manaster 
(1990) and Carter et al.(1998). These rankings have then been modified using more recent 
data available. The rankings are assigned on the basis of information found in tombstones 
published on the covers of IPO prospectuses. The higher and more often the underwriter 
appears in the tombstones studied the higher the given ranking is. More detailed description 
of the ranking process can be found in the three above-mentioned studies.
The sample is divided into two subgroups, prestigious and non-prestigious. The first group 
consists of issues with a ranking of 9 on a 0 - 9 scale corresponding to the convertible debt 
issues with the most prestigious investment banks as underwriters. The second group includes 
the rest of the issues. It is noteworthy that the same convertible debt issue can include several
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banks as underwriters called co-lead managers. The ranking in these cases is assigned 
according to the first underwriter mentioned in the SDC database.
The differences of the initial returns in the two groups are quite clear according to the results 
in Table VIII. The mean initial excess return for the prestigious underwriter group is 0.69%. 
For the non-prestigious group, the mean is 1.70%. In addition, the mean initial excess return 
in the non-prestigious group is very significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.000. 
The mean does not significantly differ from zero in the prestigious group. Similar results are 
achieved using initial raw returns. A boxplot diagram in Appendix VII visualizes the 
differences between the initial excess returns in the two groups. From the diagram it is worth 
noting that convertible debt offerings underwritten by prestigious underwriters not only have 
lower median initial excess return but they are also more concentrated around the median. A 
difference in means test for equal variances, though, gives a p-value of only 0.079 for the 
inequality of the mean initial excess returns.
Table VIII
Initial percentage returns divided into subsamples by underwriter prestigiousness
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. Prestigious underwriters include 
underwriters with a ranking of 9 on a 0 - 9 scale. Other underwriters are classified as non-prestigious. 
Rankings are based on Loughran and Ritter (2001). Percent positive is the percentage of positive 
returns. P-value describes the significance level in a 2-tailed t-test. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
of the Wilcoxon sign-rank test at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The sample data excludes 
the Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return.
Initial raw return Mean return Median Min Max Percent
(p-value) return return return positive
Prestigious 0.74 0.16 -4.75 13.00 74.5
(N = 47) (0.079)
Non-prestigious 1.90 ^ 39*** -4.62 12.00 80.7
(N = 57) (0.000)
Initial excess return
Prestigious 0.69 0.53 -4.08 10.63 57.4
(N = 47) (0.075)
Non-prestigious 1.70 j 14*** -4.63 10.29 70.2
(N = 57) (0.000)
7.2.5 Probability of conversion
The eighth hypothesis predicts a positive relation between the probability to conversion and 
the initial underpricing of convertible debt offerings. The probability of conversion of the 
convertible bond is measured with the CP ratio as described in section 4. The CP ratio is
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calculated as the conversion price divided by the underlying stock price at one day before the 
issue. This ratio is used as a proxy for the equity component of the convertible bond. A larger 
CP ratio implies a smaller probability of conversion, which implies a larger equity component 
in the convertible bond.
The average CP ratio for the whole sample is 1.25, which means that the conversion price of 
the sample convertible debt issues, on average, was set at 25% above the stock price at issue. 
The Pearson correlation between the initial excess return and the CP ratio is 0.046 with a p- 
value of 0.649. In addition, the correlation between the CP ratio and the initial raw return is 
negative (and insignificant). Therefore, the CP ratio does not seem to have any relation with 
the initial pricing of the convertible debt offerings.
7.2.6 Market sentiment
In this section the ninth hypothesis, the relation between the market sentiment and initial 
underpricing, is examined. Hot-issue market is defined as a period, in which equity markets 
have risen. In this thesis the S&P Europe 350 Index, which was presented earlier in Figure 6, 
represents the equity market. Gong and Shekhar (2001) proxy the market sentiment with a 30- 
trading day pre issue return. Here, a period of 60 trading days before the issue and a 30- 
trading day period ending 30 trading days before the issue are also used.
Following Loughran and Ritter (2002) I first divide the sample convertible debt offerings into 
three categories by the pre-issue market return in Figure 13. The development of the initial 
return is clear. The mean initial excess return in the category, where the stock market has 
declined during the 60 days before the issue, is only 0.53% and not significantly different 
from zero. The mean initial return rises to 1.3% and 2.3% as the pre-issue market return 
climbs to the range 0.0% - 6.0% and over 6.0%, respectively. Using the money left on the 
table concept, which was described in section 7.1, the average amount is as high as €9.6 
million in the group where the market has risen by over 6.0% during the 60 days prior to the 
issue. This is clearly higher than for the whole sample (€6.4 million) and also clearly higher 
than in the other two groups in Figure 13.
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< 0.0% 0.0% - 6.0% > 6.0%
60-day pre-issue stock market return
■■Money left on the table------- Mean initial excess return
Figure 13. Initial returns and the amount of money left on the table categorized by prior market 
movements in the sample of 104 European convertible debt offerings. The initial excess return is 
the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. 
Money left on the table is defined as the initial raw return times the size of the issue. Prior market 
movement is measured using the S&P Europe 350 Index 60-day pre-issue return. The sample sizes for 
the three categories starting from the lowest market return are 33, 33 and 39, respectively. The sample 
data excludes the Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return.
Table IX shows the correlation matrix for the initial returns, amount of money left on the 
table and the market sentiment variables. All correlation factors between the market sentiment 
variables and the initial return variables are positive, as expected. The largest correlation 
(0.165) and significance (p-value of 0.094) is achieved using the 60-day pre-issue return, but 
the results are not significant at conventional levels. The relation between the initial excess 
return and the market sentiment variables can be seen also in Figure 18 and Figure 19 in 
Appendix VIII. The lack of statistical significance is also clear from these figures. The 
amount of money left on the table receives a significant (p-value of 0.028) and positive 
correlation (0.216) with the 60-day pre-issue stock market return. This implies that issuers 
incur larger indirect costs in the form of underpricing in hot issue markets, i.e. when the 
equity markets have risen.
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Table IX
Pearson correlations between initial return and market sentiment variables
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. Money left on the table is defined as the 
initial raw return times the size of the issue. The last three variables denoted with S&P are S&P 
Europe 350 Index pre-issue returns. The first two are for the periods of 30 trading days and 60 trading 
days before the issue. The last return is calculated for the period of 30 trading days ending 30 trading 
































































Partitioning the sample data by country of issuance introduces more significant results in 
France (N = 35). The French subsample indicates a positive correlation factor of 0.371 with a 
0.028 p-value between the initial excess return and the 60-day pre-issue S&P Europe 350 
Index return. The correlation between money left on the table and 60-day pre-issue stock 
market return is 0.395 with a p-value as low as of 0.019. The market sentiment, therefore, 
seems to impact the initial pricing of convertible debt offerings in Europe and especially in 
France.
7.3 Regression analysis
This section combines the most relevant variables from previous sections into multivariate 
regression analysis. The variables that reached at least some significance related with the 
initial pricing of convertible debt offerings are issue size divided by issuer size, standard 
deviation of stock returns, underwriter reputation and 60-day pre-issue stock market return.
Panel A in Table X presents four regressions using the sample, which excludes the outlier, 
Augusta convertible issue with a 20.35% initial excess return. In Panel В the regressions
-48-
include the Augusta issue for comparison. The dependent variable used in all regressions is 
the initial excess return.3 The first regression includes the single variable with the most 
explanatory power. This is the issue size/firm size variable, which relates to the price-pressure 
hypothesis and was already regressed against the initial excess return in Table VII. Panel A 
presents the previous results, but Panel В shows that including the whole sample in the 
regression the issue size/firm size coefficient increases from 5.98 to 8.51 and the significance 
of this result also increases (p-value of 0.027). In addition, explanatory power grows to 5.0% 
measured with R2.
To restrict the effect of differences in different markets, the French sample (N = 33) is studied 
separately. Using the French sample the issue size/firm size variable receives a coefficient of 
9.33, which is significant at the 5% level and also larger than with the whole sample. The 
explanatory power of this single variable is as high as 14.5% measured with R2. In other 
markets the regression did not receive any significance. The sample sizes in the other markets 
are also clearly lower.
In the second regression in Table X the market sentiment variable, which is the 60-day pre­
issue S&P Europe 350 Index return, is added to the model. In Panel A the regression shows 
significance for the individual coefficients only at the 10% level, but the whole model is 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for the market sentiment is small but positive 
implying higher initial returns in markets with higher pre-issue stock market performance. 
The model shows 6.4% explanatory power. Panel В shows that the significance levels and the 
explanatory power of the model once again increase when the whole sample is included in the 
regression. The coefficients for the variables also increase. Using the whole sample the two- 
variable model receives a p-value of 0.015 and an R2 of 8.4%.
Again the French market is analyzed and the explanatory power of the two independent 
variables used is as high as 30.8% measured with R2. The coefficient of the issue size/firm 
size variable is 8.89, which is higher than for the whole sample. The market sentiment seems 
to also have a stronger effect in the French market since the coefficient rises to 0.184. The 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and the whole model receives a p-value of 0.005. 
Significant results were not achieved in the other markets separately.
3 Initial raw return is also used as the dependent variable and the results are qualitatively the same.
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Table X
Regressions of the initial excess returns on explanatory variables for a sample of 97 
European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 
at the closing market price on the first day of public trading. In Panel A the sample data excludes the 
Augusta convertible with a 20.35% initial excess return. In Panel В this issue is included in the data. 
Seven other issues are excluded due to insufficient data. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
Panel A: The sample excludes the convertible issue with an initial excess return of 20.35%
Regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.670 0.507 0.0763 0.115
(0.113) (0.236) (0.934) (0.911)




S&P 60-day return 0.0758 0.0663 0.0737
(0.089) (0.130) (0.105)
Underwriter reputation -0.847 -0.584
(0.144) (0.341)
F-ratio 3.45 3.23* 2.706* 2.01
(0.066) (0.044) (0.049) (0.099)
R2 (%) 3.5 6.4 7.7 8.2
Sample size 97 97 97 97
Panel B: The sample includes the convertible issue with an initial excess return of 20.35%.
Regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.621 0.412 0.354 0.217
(0.213) (0.413) (0.743) (0.858)




S&P 60-day return 0.0982 0.0891 0.0961
(0.062) (0.084) (0.073)
Underwriter reputation -1.158 -0.828
(0.089) (0.253)
F-ratio 5.059* 4.38* 2.924* 2.60*
R2 (%)
(0.027) (0.015) (0.038) (0.041)
5.0 8.4 8.1 10.3
Sample size 97 97 97 97
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The third regression in Table X includes the volatility of the underlying stock, market 
sentiment and underwriter reputation as independent variables. These were chosen on the 
basis that they give the most explanatory power in a three-variable model for the sample, 
where the Augusta convertible issue is excluded. The underwriter reputation is a dichotomous 
variable receiving a value of one if the underwriter has received the highest ranking of 9 and a 
value of zero in other cases.
Panel A in Table X shows that the model as a whole is significant at the 5% level. Volatility 
has a positive coefficient indicating larger initial underpricing with more volatile underlying 
stock returns. This coefficient is only modestly significant (at the 10% level), though. Market 
sentiment loses some significance compared with the two-variable model, but is still positive. 
The underwriter reputation variable has a negative relation to initial pricing implying that 
convertible debt offerings underwritten by the most prestigious investment banks are less 
underpriced than other issues. This result is not significant, though. Volatility, market 
sentiment and underwriter reputation receive 7.7% explanatory power. Using the full sample 
in Panel В in Table X the R2 is again increased compared with the results excluding the issue. 
Volatility, market sentiment and underwriter reputation have 8.1% explanatory power.
In the French sample the three-variable regression model is very significant with a p-value of 
0.006. Explanatory power measure with R2 is 33.8%. Market sentiment variable receives a 
clearly increased coefficient of 0.239 and this is also very significant (p-value of 0.004). This 
result was already found in section 7.2.6. Volatility has a more significant (p-value of 0.061) 
relation with the initial excess return than for the whole sample. Underwriter reputation is 
insignificant. In the UK, volatility receives a negative and significant coefficient. This odd 
phenomenon was already observed in Figure 11.
The final regression in Table X includes all four variables as independent variables. In Panel 
A where the Augusta issue is excluded from the sample the whole model receives a p-value of 
only 0.099. Any of the coefficients are not significant even at the 10% level. The coefficients 
do, however, receive qualitatively same values as in previous regressions. Explanatory power 
of the four-variable model rises to 8.2% measured with R“.
Panel В in Table X shows how the results are slightly more significant than in Panel A. 
Including the outlier Augusta convertible issue in the sample increases the explanatory power
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of the independent variables to 10.3%. The whole model is also significant at the 5% level, 
but from the coefficients only market sentiment receives significance even at the 10% level.
The four-variable regression model works quite well in explaining the initial excess returns in 
the French market. The model is significant at the 1% level and it receives a remarkable 41% 
explanatory power. Market sentiment has a positive coefficient of 0.23 and is significant at 
the 1% level. Issue size/firm size variable has a coefficient of 7.65 and is slightly significant 
with a p-value of 0.061. Volatility and underwriter reputation are not significant in the four- 
variable model with the French data.
To analyze the reliability of the regression analysis the correlation matrix of the independent 
variables is constructed in Appendix IX. The only independent variables with statistically 
significant correlation are the issue size/firm size and the underwriter reputation variables. 
This correlation is quite small (-0.237), though, so any severe multicollinearity problems do 
not seem to exist. In addition, Figure 20 in Appendix IX shows that the adjusted residuals of 
the regression are quite well normally distributed, which also implies a reliable regression 
model. The normality of the adjusted residuals is also verified with the Kolmogorov-Smimov 
test, which gives a p-value of 0.730 implying normality.
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7.4 Long-run performance
This section examines the long-run performance of new convertible debt issues. Mean and 
median raw and excess buy-and-hold returns from the offer price to the closing market price 6 
and 12 calendar months after the offering are calculated in Table XI. Looking first at the raw 
returns, the convertible bonds seem to perform quite well during the first year after the 
offering. The buy-and-hold return for the first six months is 5.8% and this is also significant at 
the 1% level. The first year raw return is even larger (9.24%) and significant at the 5% level. 
In the last six months the raw buy-and-hold return does not significantly differ from zero. The 
median raw returns indicate a significantly positive return only for the first six months, 
though. The excess buy-and-hold returns show no significance at all, which implies that new 
issues of convertible debt neither underperform nor outperform the market for at least in the 
first year after the offer.
Table XI
Selected mean and median percentage raw and excess buy-and-hold returns for a 
sample of 105 European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001.
The raw buy-and-hold return is calculated as the percentage return from the offer price to the closing 
price on the last day of the holding period. The excess buy-and-hold return is the convertible bond 
market-adjusted return, defined as the raw buy-and-hold return minus the corresponding UBS 
Warburg European Convertible Index return for the corresponding period. P-value describes the 
significance level in a 2-tailed t-test. *** and * indicate significance of the Wilcoxon sign-rank test at
Holding period





Initial day 1.56 0.50*** 1.43 1.03***
(0.000) (0.000)
0-6 months 5.80 1.20* 2.85 0.22
(0.005) (0.121)
6-12 months 2.66 -1.45 0.37 -1.48
(0.406) (0.894)
0-12 months 9.24 0.18 3.89 0.33
• (0.025) (0.288)
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8 Summary and conclusions
The main objective of this study was to find out whether convertible debt offerings in 
Western Europe are underpriced. Indeed, using a sample of 105 convertible debt offerings 
from the 1998 - 2001 period I report an average initial excess return of 1.43%, which is 
significant at the 0.1% level. This result is consistent with the winner's curse phenomenon 
(Rock 1986), which states that new security issues must be underpriced on average to keep 
the uninformed investors in the market. The small underpricing result also supports the fact 
that the bond market is dominated by well-informed institutional investors (Datta et al. 1997). 
The average initial excess return of 1.43% is also clearly lower than in equity IPOs but higher 
than in seasoned equity or straight debt issues, as was assumed in the first hypothesis. This is 
consistent with the differential information model by Barry and Brown (1985), which implies 
that the size of underpricing is positively related to the amount of available pricing related 
information. The underpricing result of 1.43% is also similar to the 1.11% that Kang and Lee 
(1996) found by studying 91 US convertible debt offerings in 1988 - 1992.
The sample period in this thesis was 1 October 1998 - 30 September 2001, which included 
both the techno boom and the following stock market crash. As these phenomena were quite 
extreme it is possible that the results concerning the initial pricing of convertible debt 
offerings were somewhat distorted. On the other hand, the averaged results were probably 
better in this case than if the sample period would have consisted only of a growing or 
declining equity market. It was also found in this study that the initial underpricing was at a 
higher level during the last year of the techno boom (year ending 30 September 2000). 
Therefore, the initial pricing behavior of convertible debt seemed to follow the manners of the 
IPO market in the same period. Any statistically significant differences in initial pricing in 
different time periods were not found, though.
The second hypothesis tested in this thesis was the price pressure hypothesis by Wasserstein 
and Wydler (1988). In contrast to what Wasserstein and Wydler (1988) found for straight 
bonds in the Swiss capital market and Kang and Lee (1996) found for convertible bonds in the 
US market, some support for the price pressure hypothesis was found in this study. First, the 
initial underpricing was found to slightly grow with growing size classes. Second, the issue 
size divided by the issuing company size was found to be a statistically significant factor in 
explaining the initial excess returns using the whole sample. The variable explained 4% of the
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cross-sectional variation in initial excess returns. Third, the issue size had a very strong and 
significant linear correlation (0.59) with the initial excess returns using the UK data, albeit the 
sample size was quite small (N = 14).
Datta et al. (1997) found that IPOs of speculative grade debt are significantly underpriced at 
issue while investment grade IPOs are significantly overpriced at issue. The results of this 
thesis indicate, however, that bond rating is not a significant determinant of initial European 
convertible debt offering returns and the third hypothesis is rejected. This result is consistent 
with the results obtained from the US convertible debt market in the study by Kang and Lee 
(1996). Also the fourth hypothesis, which stated that initial underpricing should be lower with 
more mature issuers, did not receive any significant support. Strong empirical evidence 
supporting this hypothesis was found by Ritter (1991) for equity IPOs and Kang and Lee 
(1996) for convertible debt offerings in the US.
The standard deviation and the beta the of the underlying stock were hypothesized to act as 
proxies for ex ante uncertainty regarding the market clearing price of the new issue and, 
therefore, have a positive relation with the initial excess returns. This was the subject of 
hypotheses five and six. The standard deviation was found to be positively correlated with the 
initial excess returns with a factor of 0.181, but this result was significant only at the 10% 
level. The equity beta did not show any relation to the initial pricing. Kang and Lee (1996) 
could also not relate the standard deviation of stock returns with initial underpricing of US 
convertible debt offerings, but they found that equity beta was a significant determinant of the 
initial returns.
The seventh hypothesis assumed that the degree of underpricing in European convertible debt 
offerings is inversely related to the underwriter’s reputation. In contrast to Kang and Lee 
(1996), who did not find evidence for US convertible debt offerings, some support was found 
in this thesis. The mean initial excess return for the less prestigious underwriter group was 
1.70% with 70.2% of the returns positive. The result for the prestigious underwriter group 
was 0.69% with 57.4% of the returns positive. The means differed from each other only at the 
10% significance level, though. The list of underwriter rankings was obtained from Loughran 
and Ritter (2001), who constructed it from the US perspective. This might slightly distort the 
results obtained with European data since in Europe investments banks might be rated slightly 
differently.
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The eighth hypothesis suggested that a larger equity component in a convertible bond 
measured with the probability to conversion would be related with higher initial returns. The 
probability of conversion was calculated as the conversion price divided by the underlying 
stock price at one day before the issue and it was found to have no relation with the initial 
pricing of the European convertible debt offerings.
The ninth hypothesis suggested that convertible debt issued in hot-issue markets would be 
more underpriced than in other periods. This market sentiment was measured with the 60-day 
pre-issue S&P Europe 350 Index return. The above discussion related with the three time 
periods, in which the initial excess returns were measured already indicated that market 
sentiment seems to have an impact on the initial pricing of convertible debt offerings. In 
addition, it was found that the 60-day pre-issue stock market return had a correlation factor of 
0.165 with the initial excess returns. This was significant only at the 10% level, though. 
Applying the money left on the table concept showed a positive and significant correlation 
with the market sentiment variable. This result is consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
and implies that issuers are not as concerned about the indirect costs of underpricing in a 
favorable market situation as they are in a bad market situation. The results related with 
market sentiment could have been more significant if the pre-issue return of each individual 
stock market would have been used as a measure of market sentiment.
In a four-variable regression model issue size/firm size, volatility, market sentiment and 
underwriter reputation could significantly explain 10.3% of the cross-sectional variation in 
initial excess returns. As comparison, Kang and Lee (1996) resulted with 9.6% explanatory 
power (measured with an adjusted R2) for the initial excess returns of US convertible debt 
offerings using the logarithm of issuer age, volatility, bond rating, duration and equity beta as 
independent variables.
The one-year performance of new convertible debt offerings was also investigated by looking 
at the buy-and-hold returns for 6 and 12 months after the issue. The examination of excess 
returns revealed no significant results, which implies that new issues of European convertible 
debt neither underperform nor outperform the market for at least in the first year after the 
offer. This result is similar to Kang and Lee’s (1996) findings in the US convertible debt 
market, but contradictory to results obtained by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), for example, 
who found that IPOs significantly underperform their seasoned counterparts in the one-year
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period after issue. The same phenomenon for IPOs was documented by Ritter (1991) using a 
three-year after-issue period.
Looking at the results it is clear that European convertible debt offerings are, on average, 
slightly underpriced. Any clear and significant determinants for this underpricing are difficult 
to find, though. The best regression model could explain only about 10% of the cross 
sectional variation in initial excess returns. The offerings in the sample were issued in 
different countries with differently functioning convertible debt markets. In different markets 
there may be different factors that influence the pricing of security offerings. Possibly better 
results could have been obtained using a longer time period and only a few countries so that 
results in single countries would receive significance and different countries could be reliably 
compared. On the other hand, Kang and Lee (1996) studied purely the US convertible debt 
market and found variables explaining still only 10% of the initial excess returns. This may be 
due to the fact that convertible bonds are complex securities with so many unique 
characteristics in each issue that it is difficult to isolate individual factors related with the 
underpricing of convertible debt offerings. In addition, the sample consisted of convertible 
debt offerings by firms that already had convertibles outstanding and of firms that issued their 
first convertible bond to the market. Clearly, this affects the pricing of a new issue because 
there is less ex ante uncertainty related to the market clearing price of the new issue for a firm 
that already has convertible debt outstanding. This difference in uncertainty is not as large as 
in equity IPOs vs. seasoned equity offerings, though, because of the numerous characteristics 
of convertible bonds that make the bonds even from the same company different.
A lot of unstudied area remains in the pricing of convertible debt offerings. First, the 
examination of the European convertible debt market should be conducted in a single market 
(country) using a long time frame and studying only IPOs of convertible debt. This would 
reduce the problems mentioned earlier. Second, almost everything that has been studied in the 
field of IPO underpricing could be studied with convertible debt offerings. This would 
include, for example, examining the hypotheses that issuers underprice to reduce their legal 
liability (Keloharju 1993) or that underpricing is a substitute for costly marketing 
expenditures (Habib and Ljungqvist 2001). Third, theories for the pricing of convertible debt 
offerings all come from the equity IPO and straight debt offering literature. It would be 
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Frequency table of initial percentage returns for a sample of 105 European convertible
debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001
The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market price 
on the first day of public trading. The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the 
corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return.
Initial Raw Return Initial Excess Return
Frequency % Frequency %
-5 < R < -4 3 2.9 2 1.9
-4 < R < -3 3 2.9 2 1.9
-3 < R < -2 4 3.8 8 7.6
-2 < R < -1 4 3.8 10 9.5
-1 <R<0 9 8.6 15 14.3
0 < R < 1 33 31.4 15 14.3
1 <R<2 18 17.1 20 19.0
2 < R < 3 9 8.6 6 5.7
3 < R < 4 4 3.8 9 8.6
4 < R < 5 5 4.8 6 5.7
5 < R < 6 3 2.9 4 3.8
6 < R < 7 2 1.9 2 1.9
7 < R < 8 1 1.0 2 1.9
8 < R < 9 3 2.9 1 1.0
9<R< 10 0 0 0 0
10<R< 11 1 1.0 2 1.9
11 <R< 12 0 0 0 0
12<R< 13 1 1.0 0 0





This test is used to test whether the initial raw and excess returns are normally distributed. H0 is that 
the variable is normally distributed. A p-value (Sig.) of over 0.05 indicates that the variable is 
normally distributed.
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Initial Raw Initial Excess 
Return Return
N 105 105
Normal Parameters3,0 Mean 1,56 1,42
Std. Deviation 3,68 3,47
Most Extreme Absolute ,176 ,125
Differences Positive ,176 ,125
Negative -,135 -,071
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,81 1,28
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,003 ,076
a. Test distribution is Normal.
b. Calculated from data.
Table XIV 
Student’s t-test
The t-test shows that the means of both R1 and RE1 are significant at the 0.1% level.
One-Sample Statistics
Std. Error
N Mean Std. Deviation Mean
Initial Raw Return 105 1,56 3,68 ,36
Initial Excess Return 105 1,42 3,47 ,34
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0
95% Confidence
Mean Interval of the Difference
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Lower Upper
Initial Raw Return 4,349 104 ,000 1,56 ,85 2,27




Wilcoxon signed ranks test for the median of the initial returns
HO is that the median of R1 is zero. The p-values (Sig.) for both the R1 and RE1 are 0.000 so HO is 
rejected and the median is significantly (0.1% level) different from zero.
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
ZERO - Initial Raw Return Negative Ranks 65a 46,41 3016,50
Positive Ranks 23b 39,11 899,50
Ties 17°
Total 105
ZERO - Initial Excess Negative Ranks 67d 58,58 3925,00
Return Positive Ranks 37e 41,49 1535,00
Ties 1f
Total 105
a. ZERO < Initial Raw Return 
b- ZERO > Initial Raw Return
c. Initial Raw Return = ZERO
d. ZERO < Initial Excess Return
e. ZERO > Initial Excess Return 
f- Initial Excess Return = ZERO
Test Statistic^3
ZERO - Initial ZERO - Initial
Raw Return Excess Return
Z -4,404a -3,875a
Asvmp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ХЮ0
a. Based on positive ranks.




Initial returns by country of issuance
Initial raw return (Rj) is the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market 
price on the first day of public trading. Initial excess return is the market adjusted return defined as Ri 
minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. The results below are 
from a total sample of 105 European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001.
Country of issuance Initial Raw Return Initial Excess Return





Std. Deviation - -





Std. Deviation 3.37 3.20





Std. Deviation 10.41 9.57





Std. Deviation - -





Std. Deviation 1.13 1.73





Std. Deviation 3.74 2.96





Std. Deviation 2.39 2.84









T-test for the equality of mean initial excess returns of convertible bonds issued in
France and Luxembourg
Initial raw return (R,) is the return from buying at the offer price and selling at the closing market 
price on the first day of public trading. Initial excess return is the market adjusted return defined as R] 
minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European Convertible Index return. The results below are 
from a total sample of 105 European convertible debt offerings in the period 1998 - 2001. Levene's 
test for equality of variances gives a p-values of under 0.05 so equal variances are not assumed. If the 
p-value (Sig.) of the t-test for the equality of means is under 0.05 the H0 is rejected and the means 
differ from each other.
Country of 
issuance N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
Initial Raw Return France 35 2,22 3,37 ,57
Luxembourg 22 ,56 1,13 ,24
Initial Excess Return France 35 2,28 3,20 ,54
Luxembourg 22 ,57 1,73 ,37
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Initial Raw Return Equal variances assumed 19,111 ,000 2,23 55 ,030
Equal variances not 
assumed
2,69 45,00 ,010
Initial Excess Return Equal variances assumed 10,079 ,002 2,29 55 ,026





Issue size Logarithm of issue size
Figure 14. The relationship between initial excess return and issue size in the sample of 105 





Logarithm of issue size
Figure 15. The relationship between initial excess return and issue size in the United Kingdom,
The sample includes 14 convertible debt offerings from the period 1998 - 2001.
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Appendix VII
Time to maturity (years)
Figure 16. The relationship between initial excess return and time to maturity in the sample of 
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Non-prestigious Prestigious
Classified underwriter ranking
Figure 17. A boxplot diagram describing the initial excess returns of bonds underwritten by 
prestigious vs. non-prestigious underwriters in the sample of 104 European convertible debt 
offerings. The box represents the interquartile range which contains 50% of the values. The whiskers 
are lines that extend from the box to the highest and lowest values. A line across the box indicates the 




S&p 350 30 day pre-issue return S&P 350 60 day pre-issue return
Figure 18. The relationship between initial excess return and market sentiment in the sample of 
104 convertible debt offerings. The 30- and 60-day pre-issue returns for the S&P Europe 350 Index 







S&P 350 30 day return (60-30) S&P 350 60 day pre-issue return
Figure 19. The relationship between initial excess return/money left on the table and market 
sentiment in the sample of 104 convertible debt offerings. The 30-day pre-issue return for the S&P 
Europe 350 Index for a period ending 30 trading days before the issue is on the x-axis. Money left on 
the table is defined as the initial raw return times the size of the issue. The sample excludes one issue 




Pearson correlations between regression variables
The initial excess return is the initial raw return minus the corresponding UBS Warburg European 
Convertible Index return. The initial raw return is the return from buying at the offer price and selling 











































Dependent Variable: Initial Excess Return
Std. Dev = ,98 




Figure 20. Analysis of regression residuals. The figure depicts the histogram of the adjusted 
residuals from the four-variable regression model in Panel В in Table X.
